"Was I my best?"
-Dollhouse, ep. 1.13, "Epitaph One"
The human lives. In all its bloody fleshiness, it lives. There is a bloody life of veins and arteries and nervous systems that remind me of circuitry, of electricity. The body reminds me of a circuitry that does not remind me of the bloody body. With consideration for all his physiological complexity, his body is called homo sapien,
human. And as his body is named "human," human becomes his name, his sole identifier.
The embodiment of the human is wholly dependent upon his biology, thusly revealing the confines of his own ideological existence. The human defines his existence in bodily terms, and he has done so historically, bit by bit building the paradigm of embodiment. Imagination of the human always beckons, at the very least, the images of his body in sagittal and coronal planes, standing naked and tall, with neutral face and open palms. The human looks like this, a picture of his skeleton. A little later, when the human becomes the person, he will still look like this.
Maybe more decorated, less uniform, more cultured. When he becomes his self, he will still look like this. 2 He lives a conflation of his body and his self. He lives as his body lives, 2 Here, I am trying to make allusion to the idea of the body before culture. It's a little "chicken or the egg," I admit, but it is an ideological step that I think needs to be made in drawing up the dependency upon embodiment that happens in processes of person-making. This body can also be understood as the human devoid of Marcel Mauss's "body techniques." faithfully linked to his biology. His body informs him of his needs, and he obliges. It tells him when to eat and when to sleep. The obligations become his habits, and from his habits he conceives of time, a clock. The body does not absorb the clock; the body is the clock. It counts time for him in heartbeats and circadian rhythms and the way it gains weight in wintertime. It moves him to urinate or defecate. He does his best to be responsible to his body's dictations. He does his best to do as he is told.
His heartbeats are counted, with utmost importance subsequently assigned, until their very last. Upon his death, his peers will recount his life in the sum of his heartbeats. The human heart beats 42 million times a year, roughly. The first leading cause of death in humans is heart disease. 3 The Sphynx asked Oedipus, "Which creature walks on four legs in the morning, two legs in the afternoon, and three in the evening?"
There is a certain narrative to being a human person. Certain habits of his self, that have always only been habits, have been absorbed, naturalized into a story of his person. It is a legacial story, that is, of the legacy of person-making.
The person is born. He lives. He dies. And as it happens with the invention of his name, "human," the narrative of humankind naturalizes his very selfhood as, reflexively, his very self naturalizes this narrative, this story of the habit of living.
When I am four years old, I sleep in a cradle next to the bed of my parents.
One night, I find that my heart is an anchor, and I weep instead of sleep. When my mother scoops me up in consultation, I tell her that I am afraid of dying.
My parents make nighttime chuckles in the dark.
They do not tell me that my soul will live forever. They do not tell me that my body is a shell. Instead, my mother tells me that I should not be afraid because that day, the day of my death, is a long time from now.
When I am seven years old, my mother's body ceases function. Her heartbeats are recounted in sum.
The trouble with embodiment is that it is an ideological debt. Though the body is only a conduit, only a container, only the column atop which is propped the mind, the human person owes it for its function. In exchange for containing his spirit, the body insists upon its own importance through injury and pain and pleasure and orgasm. "You need me," the body maintains, "You depend on me." From bodily habits and dictations, the human person, in an attempt to conserve his self, internalizes in his self his responsibilities to the body. "The collapsing of morality into health is an old rhetorical strategy." 4 He tells himself that this exchange is moral, that this is a debt he owes. The confession of debt furthermore encourages him towards the collapse between the body and his self.
In early November, the night after a night of cigarettes instead of sleep, sitting on the front steps embracing the freezing cold, I lay in my bed debilitated and sobbing. My roommate attacks my migraine with her fingertips pressing into the back of my neck.
Through tears and blankets and the dark I say, "It always feels like I'm being punished. Migraines always feel like I'm being punished, struck down where I stand." My bed, luckily. My car, I had to pull over. A café. I have spent one, a total of four hours, on the floor of a bathroom stall in Madrid.
It feels like dying. I want Emma with me not because there is fleeting relief in her hands but because I don't want to be alone if I bleed from the ears and died. "I hope I'm not loosening a clot," she says.
I hope so too, I think. Her fingers press into the base of my skull, where my neck ends. There is relief there, like a key in a lock.
There is the tumultuous impact of my mobile phone, vibrating against my desk. Only two buzzes at a time. I avoid picking it up until I convince myself that it is potentially important. The electric glow hurts my eyes and my brain clamps down on itself. I wonder why I insisted on this background, electric white. I am angry with myself.
I read the messages, but I can't bring myself to answer them. I can't get a grasp on affinity, and I feel alone; my body has claimed me for itself. All I can do is count my breaths until the crushing stops, or, with luck, I fall asleep in spite of it.
This cannot be what agency feels like. Or maybe it is. In the dull glow after the fact, still in the clothes I had on since morning, I cannot decide if I want to believe that I had brought this on myself. Maybe this is what agency feels like. I haven't eaten since the sun was in the sky. Through the dull thud of the remnants of the migraine, I make eggs in a basket. I eat. I drink milk from a one dollar wine glass. I wander the house. Eventually, with reluctance, I return to bed. I flip through books before I settle on Yusef Komunyakaa's collection of poetry, Pleasure Dome. I stick small blue post-its to some of the pages. The occasional pang still comes at the right side of my head.
As I brush my teeth, I think about how I want to cry some more.
Debt is his legacy. He owes his father for his name, for his body, and for his ideology. His imagination of himself stands rooted in biology, and "biology tells tales about origins, about genesis, and about nature." His biology is his inheritance, succeeded through the "patriarchal voice," "the paternal line." "Biology is the science of life, conceived and authored by a word from the father… The word was Aristotle's, Galileo's, Bacon's, Newton's, Linnaeus's, Darwin's…," 5 and not his own.
The legacy of human selfhood is the obligation to the biology of his body. And these debts to the body, now internalized by habit, make the bars of his imprisonment. He pays his obligations like bail, anything to keep his self from rotting in his prison cell. -Santa Teresa de Âvila 5 Haraway, "Biological Theory," 470. The full sentence reads: "The word was Aristotle's, Galileo's, Bacon's, Newton's, Linnaeus's, Darwin's; the flesh was woman's." Note here the dualism to which Haraway draws attention and which she, and I, later confront. What is important to note now is the emergence of dualisms and their alleged cruciality to the process of modern person-making. Word/flesh and man/woman are only two among many that run parallel to each other and in support of genealogical paradigms.
The trouble with embodiment, also, is that the person cannot be two places at once; the person is bound. He and his selfhood ends where and when his body ends. This is the crux of human singularity. The human self's obligation to the body, and the mutual absorption between them, will always boil down to a condition of solitary individualism. This is not due to the symbolism of bodily singularity, necessarily, but because of a modern ideological anchor to the body as integral to the constitution of the person enforces an illusion of wholeness and cohesion, and a containment of the self. 6 Further, in the subject-making of the individual person, he is defined by where he is not, by the negative space around the body, and the limits of his self. The 6 Katherine P. Ewing, "The Illusion of Wholeness: Culture, Self, and the Experience of Inconsistency, " Ethos Vol. 18, No. 3 (Sep., 1990) , 251-278. narrative of humanness relies on its imminent end. Humankind depends on his deathday to qualify his humanity. Beyond the matter of his imminent end, the human person also has no say regarding his self in the matter of his death. He will end when his body ends, no questions asked. Like habit, the body falls and the anchor of his single mortality drags the person close behind.
Despite his stubborn anchor to his old narrative, the person owes itself, also, to a past of transformation. Just as the construction of modernity was not an arbitrary compilation, the human person did not conceive of himself overnight. Rather, the person is a compilation of ideological shifts. In being so, the conditions of personhood have always been transient and susceptible to the influences of discourse. The matter, then, is the potentiality he wagers when his ideologies are reluctant to shift. The person risks his own transformation when he depends too heavily on the too familiar stories that he has written into his own bones, his anchors. In linear concepts of time, there are three temporal specificities to the construction of any moment: before the moment, the moment itself, and after the moment. Death, like life, contains its own trilogical narrative. Specific to the event of death, these temporal generalizations can be loosely referred to as anticipation, death, and lack/negation/absence, respectively.
Prior
In the construction of anticipation, something key to condition of anticipation is that, especially in the case of death, the event is imminent. This sets death apart from, for example, events of crisis, emergency or trauma. Death carries within itself, always, the certain fact of it eventual occurrence. Even in accepting the eventual occurrence of death, the human person lacks the ability to know the specific temporal moment at which death will occur. To the human person, death is temporally unhinged, and his only grasp of it is his imagination of it. With plans and caution, the person makes a futile attempt to ground death in a single temporal moment in the face of death's constant potential and intangibility. Along with any "defense" the person might erect against death, he also constructs an anxiety. Anxiety can be similarly found in the "planning" of death, in the imagination of future death.
"Imagining the future is a kind of nostalgia." 7 Imagination of futurity is a nostalgia that fuels anxiety, a worry for the unknown, the temporally nonspecific; the person makes a haunting out of future death, a ghost of moments yet to come. 8 The rhetoric of suicide prevention functions on this very anxiety.
The rhetoric of suicide prevention functions as a buffer against the haunting of potentially imminent death. The classic list of suicidal "warning signs" is an example of moments in which a subject engages "too much" with death. Suicide prevention resists all engagements with death whether intellectual, artistic, but most obviously, physiological. Consider, for example, anxieties often expressed in response to conversations regarding death, anxieties towards occupations such as those of morticians, or the cultural fascination with fictionalized death. These engagements are cause for human anxiety because they make the haunting of death "too" salient.
The notion of personhood is not sustainable in the face of an ever more materializing death. The rule that the anxieties dictate is that a person cannot simultaneously be a person that experiences, imagines, or deals in death and still properly "function" and "live." The more his finitude dictates his existence, the less the person can live.
In conceiving death only as an eventuality, the human builds himself around a law of finitude. All things in life suddenly become a race against an illusive timer.
The anxiety of his own death within the context of his bodily singularity constructs a sort of centrism. Consider, for example, the peculiarity of the social commendation for one human to have "outlived" another. I suggest that in devotion to this law of finitude, this ideology of "timed life," humankind also makes finite possibilities of 7 John Green, What I mean to point out is the contradiction inherent to this notion of "living."
Carpe diem is simultaneously an embrace of life and death. "Live because you are alive" can very well be re-articulated as "live because you are dying." This prompts the question: can you live and die at the same time? What I mean to suggest, here, is that this discrepancy reveals the ideological collision between rhetorics of living and dying and that the rules of "living" are dependent upon the rules of "dying." So, if this is the kind of life that we decide to ideologically lead, why do we bother?
There is a particularity to the moment of death. The human person is counted to the sum of his heartbeats, down to the minute. "Time of death, threesixteen." The moment itself, the moment in which a person dies is fleeting, momentous at best. 9
As mentioned, human personhood functions on laws of physiologically 9 Obviously there are narratives that counter this perspective such as in persons dying of chronic disease, comatose persons, or persons to which others refer to as "wasting away." Consider, however, that even these narratives of prolonged death are in themselves still punctuated by the death moment, thus revealing previous descriptions to be distortions of prolonged life rather than the extension of the moment of death. embodied presence, thereby asserting death in opposition as functioning on principles of negation and lack. In death, the body is removed. Once aligned with the principles of biological embodiment that dictate the individuality of experience, the person cannot actually experience the event of death. Rather, the experience of death, even at the most intimate, is only ever the body's encounter with the death of another, not the living of one's own. My friend Jes sends me a link to a piece of art via Facebook instant messaging.
They say that it was done by a queer fat Asian trans femme artist who killed herself yesterday. They tell me that it might mean something to me. 10 The moment feels familiar. Repetitious. Before even, "Not another one," I have already thought, "Another one." Another one down. "Dropping like flies," as the saying goes.
I remember I do not slow down. I move on. "We are in it for the long haul," as they say, and I do not have time to mourn every suicide of every queer brown person that happens in a culture that produces these deaths, that makes these moments familiar. In the moment, I think she has been taken completely by sadness, consumed by pain, like the stories with which we are so familiar. Suicide is just a thing that happens to sad people. Out of habit, I calculate her death as negation.
Somewhere, Mark Aguhar's body has been carted away, and it no longer is.
But I think of the piece again and again. Eventually I find out it is titled Not You (Power Circle). I find myself repeating it to myself under the showerhead. I find myself repeating it to myself in bed. Eventually I have the image tattooed atop my right shoulder blade. 10 In the case that my reader is unfamiliar, the pronoun "they" is often used in regards to persons who prefer the usage of gender-neutral pronouns. Such is the case of Jes. Mark most often preferred female gendered pronouns, but was also known to use "they."
Principles of the body dictate that the experience of death cannot be felt for oneself. "Whether he lives or dies, Man cannot immediately know death." 11 The experience of death is always one's own body encountering the death of the body of another. The experience of death is never the experience of one's own death. That is to say, humankind experiences death after the fact, often through grief.
Grief can never be arbitrary because grief is grounded in principles of negation, of absence. In turn, absence requires context and contexts must be created, like a room must be build before a room can be considered empty. What specifically are you absent from? I feel in my stomach, my gut, an obsession for the physicality of things and bodies. The binary of presence and absence. The mourning circulates around her death and the movements of her body. The mourning haunts me more than her death does, like flies to a carcass, obsessing over the inanimate, speaking for the dead.
They use her corpse as a soapbox. That troubles me.
When I speak of her, persons ask me "How did she die?" as though the condition of her now-still body are vital to her person. I think they might as well be asking, "Was there blood? Where did the blood spill from?" So eager to grow arguments from corpses, discussions on suicide run afire. Desperately, in mourning and obsession, human persons stitch together lessons to be learned, things that should have been, things that should not have. Worst yet, they glorify the things that "could have been," forgetting entirely that bodily death has always been stuck at the top of that list. Forgetting that all bucket lists, all the things to do before you die, begin with death itself. How keen we are to speak for dead persons.
I suppose, in a lot of ways, this was how it was meant to end. The water tried to take me once and I'm drawn back to this day. Especially a day like today.
- Most photos, words, and videos are just fragments, beautiful debris floating in an ocean of grief. "This came from somewhere," I think to myself. So, follow the pieces.
Following the pieces will likely bring you here:
At first I think she is ugly. I feel an itch of repulsion when I see images of her, images that she herself launched into cyber-space, inadvertently towards me. Despite the spark of resonance I find in her art, her drawings, her writings, she feels ugly to me. Her fatness, her strange hair, her bizarre self-made gowns, her brownness. All of it in tandem, I am not sure how to swallow. She looks sad, her face made up, in a self-taken photograph full of intent.
There is no memory of transition, of swallowing, of gradation or getting used to. Only the eruptions of consciousness grow stronger, louder, livelier. Scrolling garners more revelations of intent, more art, more photos, more beauty until I think them and imagine them even from a distance, even when I am away from her. I begin to wonder to myself, how can someone so dead be so alive at the same time?
The cyborg exists in a state of irony. "Irony is about contradictions that do not resolve into larger wholes, even dialectically, about the tension of holding incompatible things together because both or all are necessary and true." 15 She is both dead and alive. And in being both, she is being neither. That is, she owes nothing to the rules of either. The cyborg thrives on contradiction and contradiction necessitates ideological collision. The most vital collision to the cyborg is that of machine and organism. She is neither of the two parts but the interaction between the two; she exists as synapses.
The trouble in telling the story of the cyborg is that she has no birthday.
There is no genesis to her story. This is so because the cyborg is the spark of collision and contradiction; she is the blur of boundaries. She thrives from the collision of 16 Haraway, "Cyborg Manifesto," 130.
creature not birthed from legacy? There is no genesis without genealogy, and there is no valid genealogy for chimeras. The cyborg is a creature that births itself from accident.
Humankind, in his attachment to his machinery, never intended on the production of the cyborg. The cyborg, in her state of accident, is an illegitimate offspring. Illegitimacy is corrosive to legacy. Illegitimacy reveals that legacy and lineage is prone to accident and imperfection. There is no shining truth of pure humanity, the cyborg reveals, thus shaking all dichotomies running parallel to humanity. Borders grow weak, tired, and blurry. "Chief among these troubling dualisms are self/other, mind/body, culture/nature, male/female, civilized/primitive, reality/appearance, whole/part, agent/resource, maker/made, active/passive, right/wrong, truth/illusion, total/partial, God/man." 17
Under the weight of illegitimacy, of destabilized dualisms, individuation cannot stand; singularity and individuality cannot stand. The cyborg reveals herself as not only a being of interaction, of ironic collision, but of multiplicity. To destabilize legacy is to destabilize sequence, lineage, the rule of "one at a time." The genealogy of humanness, if there ever was such a legacy, is fractured from the perspective of the cyborg. The same goes for the genealogy of machines. The cyborg demonstrates intersections between humankind and his machines; information is not transferred in singular linearity and knowledge is not genealogical. The cyborg demonstrates the third thing of dichotomies, of dualisms because she is all the intersections between them. She is the monster that contradictions make. And 17 Haraway, "Cyborg Manifesto," 143.
monsters have never needed genealogy to be monsters. But humanness and technology have both respectively required genealogies to stand as respective singularities. But she is the being of convolution.
"To be One is to be autonomous, to be powerful, to be God; but to be One is to be an illusion, and so to be involved in a dialectic of apocalypse with the other. Yet to be other is to be multiple, without clear boundary, frayed, insubstantial." She is the network that creates her, and the network that she creates. She functions along lines of affinity and relationality because she is not protagonistic.
There is no such thing as protagonistic monsters. She frays legacial knowledge for the very sake of its dismantling. "A cyborg body is not innocent; it was not born in a garden; it does not seek unitary identity and so generate antagonistic dualisms without 18 Haraway, "Cyborg Manifesto," 143. 19 Haraway, "Cyborg Manifesto, " 132. 20 open-source: adj. Computing, denoting software for which the original source code is made freely available and may be redistributed and modified at will.
end (or until the world ends); it takes irony for granted" because she is irony itself.
Irony is her semblance of a heart, and inconstancy her heartbeat. She finds ideological irony, points out contradiction, and calls for critical revision.
The cyborg has no body. The cyborg laughs in the face of death. There is no Eden to return to. If there is no Genesis then there is no emergence, then there is no return for the cyborg.
She is only ever ethereal, and thus makes no claims to paradise; she needs not to. She does not fear death because she is born from the ideologies of death (and life). 21 Haraway, "Cyborg Manifesto," 119.
Because death has been simultaneously denaturalized yet undeniably natural, she thrives in this contradiction. The day I return, San Francisco strikes me as a creature of many habits. We make a habit out of visiting my mother's grave. There is a habit to the ritual. Or a ritual to the habit. The practice is consumed by ordinary life. One more step in a series of ordinary activities. We drive to Home Depot. We buy potted flowers because they live longer than bouquets. And they are cheaper. We bring them to the grave. We wash off the headstone and the water steams, lightly, off it. We bow three times before heading home again. And Highway 101 that takes us from Milbrae to San Francisco, it flows like habit.
Earlier that morning I am being driven to Logan Airport by the mother of a friend. We drive on the John F. Fitzgerald Expressway, under and through the city.
She calls it "the central artery," as though cities could beat with such constancy, like hearts.
Affect is always ironic. They are the moments in which contradictions make sense and surprise. How can something so ugly seem so beautiful? How can the things most vulgar, morbid, twisted, or dispirited invoke the fullest laughter, connection, or understanding? How can someone so dead seem so alive?
I can see Mark feel in surges. 25 Stewart, Ordinary Affects, 127. And they come often, the surges, in the form of jokes, or stories, or confessions, or art, or simple facts. Now they always exist in a realm of surprise and shock and contradiction. Emotionality, emotional surge, is coded as a habit of life, of the living, thus completely insensible and contradictory when received from a person known to be dead. But the cyborg lives. Maybe my body begins to inhabit her words and grow habits around the moments of 26 Stewart, Ordinary Affects, 59. encounter. "Ideologies happen. Power snaps into place. Structures grow entrenched. Identities take place. Ways of knowing become habitual at the drop of a hat." 27 But Mark will still be a cyborg, and the cyborg will always be somewhere else, thriving in every impossibility that technology makes possible, in the ironic circuitry of affect.
To speak crudely, though my experience of the cyborg happened in a context of interchange, the cyborg herself does not exist in a relation so reductive.
Interchange, exchange, between are still words that belong to a language of linearity, belonging and possession. The cyborg does not work this way, nor does affect. Affect is "transpersonal or prepersonal-not about one person's feelings becoming another's but about bodies literally affecting one another and generating intensities: human bodies, discursive bodies, bodies of thought, bodies of water." 28 To clarify further, Mark's body, now dead, is not a cyborg. I, myself, am not a cyborg. I am an agent-contained within myself emotions, thoughts, intellect and affective responses-thus I am not a cyborg. The cyborg exists as the relationality of all information, contradictory or otherwise. She is multiplicitous and she is legion while I am only human, only a conduit. But that is not to say that the cyborg is inaccessible. I, myself, as conduit, can consume and contain contradictions within myself. " [T] hings like narrative and identity become tentative though forceful compositions of disparate and moving elements." 29 The cyborg demands, "Why should our bodies end at the skin, or include at best other beings encapsulated in the 27 Stewart, Ordinary Affects, 16. 28 Stewart, Ordinary Affects, 128. 29 Stewart, Ordinary Affects, 6. 
